foundry


2022-04-25

Localization of Chip Manufacturing Rising. Taiwan to Control 48% of Global Foundry Capacity in 2022, Says TrendForce

According to TrendForce, Taiwan is crucial to the global semiconductor supply chain, accounting for a 26% market share of semiconductor revenue in 2021, ranking second in the world. Its IC design and packaging & testing industries also account for a 27% and 20% global market share, ranking second and first in the world, respectively. Firmly in the pole position, Taiwan accounts for 64% of the foundry market. In addition to TSMC possessing the most advanced process technology at this stage, foundries including UMC, Vanguard, and PSMC also have their own process advantages. Under the looming shadow of chip shortages caused by the pandemic and geopolitical turmoil in the past two years, various governments have quickly awakened to the fact that localization of chip manufacturing is necessary to avoid being cut off from chip acquisition due to logistics difficulties or cross-border shipment bans. Taiwanese companies have ridden this wave to become partners that governments around the world are eager to invite to set up factories in various locales.

Currently, 8-inch and 12-inch foundries are dominated by 24 fabs in Taiwan, followed by China, South Korea, and the United States. Looking at new factories plans post 2021, Taiwan still accounts for the largest number of new fabs, including six new plants in progress, followed in activity by China and the United States, with plans for four and three new fabs, respectively. Due to the advantages and uniqueness of Taiwanese fabs in terms of advanced processes and certain special processes, they accepted invitations to set up plants in various countries, unlike non-Taiwanese foundries who largely still build fabs locally. Therefore, Taiwanese manufacturers have successively announced factory expansions at locations including the United States, China, Japan, and Singapore in addition to Taiwan in consideration of local client needs and technical cooperation.

The focus of Taiwan’s key technologies and production expansion remains in Taiwan, accounting for 44% of global wafer production capacity by 2025

In 2022, Taiwan will account for approximately 48% of global 12-inch equivalent wafer foundry production capacity. Only looking at 12-inch wafer production capacity with more than 50% market share, the market share of advanced processes below 16nm (inclusive) will be as high as 61%. However, as Taiwanese manufacturers expand their production globally, TrendForce estimates that the market share held by Taiwan’s local foundry capacity will drop slightly to 44% in 2025, of which the market share of 12-inch wafer capacity will fall to 47% and advanced manufacturing processes to approximately 58%. However, Taiwanese foundries’ recent production expansion plans remain focused on Taiwan including TSMC’s most advanced N3 and N2 nodes, while companies such as UMC, Vanguard, and PSMC retain several new factory projects in Hsinchu, Miaoli, and Tainan.

TrendForce believes, since Taiwanese foundries have announced plans to build fabs in China, the United States, Japan, and Singapore, and foundries in numerous countries are also actively expanding production, Taiwan’s market share of foundry capacity will drop slightly in 2025. However, semiconductor enclaves do not come together quickly. The integrity of a supply chain relies on the synergy among upstream (raw materials, equipment, and wafers), midstream (IP design services, IC design, manufacturing, and packaging and testing), and downstream (brands and distributors) sectors. Taiwan has advantages in talent, geographical convenience and industrial enclaves. Therefore, Taiwanese foundries still tend to focus on Taiwan for R&D and production expansion. Looking at the existing blueprint for production expansion, Taiwan will still control 44% of the world’s foundry capacity by 2025 and as much as 58% of the world’s capacity for advanced processes, continuing its dominance of the global semiconductor industry.

2022-04-21

Opportunity and Risk for Taiwan’s Supply Chains

(AmCham Taiwan|Associate Editor: Julia Bergström) As more countries look to diversify their supply chains, Taiwan has a chance to strengthen its position in the global economy. But is its infrastructure robust enough to support expanded business?

Over the past few years, the U.S. and Taiwan have intensified their efforts to reduce reliance on China in their supply chains as a way to increase resilience. First came the U.S.-China trade dispute, in which American companies were encouraged to leave or decrease operations in China, followed by the Tsai Ing-wen administration’s reshoring initiative to bring investment from China back to Taiwan.

At the onset of the global pandemic, the flow of critical products halted, global supply chains were disrupted, and supply chain resilience became a priority for all industries. Then, just as commerce began to bounce back, Russia launched an attack on Ukraine, giving rise to new worries of geopolitically induced shortages and inflationary effects.

Meanwhile, China is pushing to indigenize its supply chains, most notably with its Made in China 2025 plan, which aims to upgrade Chinese industries’ manufacturing capabilities into more technology-intensive powerhouses and achieve independence from foreign suppliers.

Although the U.S. and Taiwan are not decoupling from China, they have significantly changed the flow of goods and investments, says Rupert Hammond-Chambers, managing director of BowerGroupAsia, a consultancy.

“Instead of 10 dollars flowing into China, you’re seeing five going to China and the other five to the Southeast Asia region, or even Taiwan,” he says. However, there is no certainty that Taiwan will gain some of China’s lost business. Rather, achieving that goal will require significant policy changes and government efforts.

For Taiwan, strengthening its role in global supply chains is more than an effort to ensure economic stability – it also has political and security implications. Hammond-Chambers sees Taiwan’s role in the semiconductor industry in particular as a “geostrategic lever that focuses other countries on the importance of Taiwan and peace and security in the Taiwan Strait.”

Taiwan accounts for over 60% of the global chip foundry market, and the island plays a pivotal role in many high-tech industries, a trend expected to continue despite pushes from the U.S. and EU to revitalize their semiconductor industries.

In fact, says Joanne Chiao, senior analyst at Taiwanese market research firm TrendForce, her organization “expects Taiwan’s market share [in the chip foundry sector] will further increase to 66% in 2022,” as some of the newly added capacity will enter mass production by the end of 2022.

Although Taiwan leads in semiconductors, domestic expansion has its limits. During a discussion on Taiwan’s role in global supply chains organized by Washington, D.C.-based public policy organization The Brookings Institution, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) Vice President of Global Government Affairs Peter Cleveland noted that the company operates “at such a massive scale that it’s mind-blowing to people. [Production] takes over 4 million gallons of water per day, the power requirements are enormous, and STEM talent is critical.”

Cleveland said he sees geographic dispersion as an advantage for the company, and the expansion of Taiwan semiconductor operations in the U.S. as a way to strengthen supply chains while alleviating chip manufacturing’s strain on Taiwan’s resources. TSMC is constructing a US$12 billion fab in Phoenix, Arizona, which is scheduled to start producing chips in 2024. It is also building a plant in Japan and is in early discussions regarding a possible fab in Germany.


Apart from expanding manufacturing abroad, Taiwan also needs to implement policies that strengthen its infrastructure, according to BowerGroupAsia’s Hammond-Chambers. Of what has been termed the island’s “five shortages” (land, power, water, labor, and talent), he refers to labor, talent, and electricity as the most critical areas for government scrutiny of existing policies.

“The energy policy of Taiwan is just not working at the moment,” he says, adding that “there’s no time to waste” when it comes to improving the power grid. “It’s a strategic issue, military issue, social issue, and economic issue – it ticks every single major box.”

Jason Hsu, a former Taiwan legislator and currently senior research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, stressed at the Brookings seminar that the shortage of semiconductor talent is already noticeable in both the U.S. and Taiwan. The island’s recent establishment of a Semiconductor Research Institute is a step in the right direction, but not enough to fill the gap, he said.

“There needs to be a comprehensive program that links U.S. and Taiwan talent development and ensures that Taiwan can continue to develop its manufacturing capability and talent,” with innovation shared between the U.S. and Taiwan, Hsu noted.

Taiwan has relaxed immigration laws to attract foreign talent, particularly from Southeast Asia, and developed work and study programs for university students, said Minister Without Portfolio John Deng during the Brookings event.

But considering that the island is on track to become a super-aged society, Taiwan could and should implement a much more robust and open immigration policy that attracts more people to make up for the shrinking labor pool. The island’s decreasing population could pose an existential threat to Taiwan if not managed, says Hammond-Chambers.

Meanwhile, Taiwan could take advantage of what some scholars have dubbed “brain circulation” to strengthen economic ties with the U.S., according to Michael Nelson, senior fellow in the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace’s Technology and International Affairs Program.

“A lot of people from Taiwan have studied overseas, and some of them bring that knowledge back to Taiwan and start companies or teach the next generation,” he says, citing the founders of TSMC and the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) as two examples. “But a lot of them are still working overseas, and they’re part of this diaspora that forms a built-in advantage for Taiwan.”

Cloud opportunities

As the world undergoes the Fourth Industrial Revolution, digital supply chain technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), algorithms, and machine learning can be used to analyze and learn from big data, which powers intelligent automation and provides supply chain managers with real-time insights that can assist quick responses to disruptions.

“When we think about how to boost our competitiveness, it doesn’t all have to be about manufacturing,” said Meriya Solis, Director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings. “We need to be mindful of the fact that we’re moving toward a digital economy.”

But while smart tools will mitigate human error, they pose a supply chain risk if they are not backed up by robust cybersecurity systems. Carnegie’s Nelson says that improving cybersecurity and investing in the Cloud of Things – integrated Internet of Things and Cloud Computing technology – would not only benefit biotech and other high-tech industries, but also create more robust supply chains for traditional industries. “It could help us do a better job of tracking fishing ports, ensuring the quality of food, and making sure cold chains are not broken,” he says.

The current global software infrastructure, notes Nelson, is built on a precarious system. Commercial software products tend to rely on complex open-source software repositories, and vulnerability in a single aspect of these repositories could compromise every commercial product that uses it.

Following an increase in cyberattacks, Taiwan’s government declared cybersecurity to be a national security issue in 2018 and proceeded to implement its Cyber Security Management Act in January 2019. The law stipulates obligations for providers of critical infrastructure, including water, energy, ICT production, and financial and healthcare services. The U.S. and Taiwan held their first joint Cyber Offensive and Defense Exercise (CODE), hosted by the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Executive Yuan’s Department of Cyber Security, in 2019.

In the past, Chinese tech seemed like it was on a steady path to market domination. But due to a high incidence of poorly written Chinese software and concerns that state actors could impel companies to embed security backdoors into their products, trust in its software is now generally low among global users. Nelson sees a lucrative opportunity for Taiwan to increase its involvement in data supply chains by establishing itself as a trusted source for more secure and better-tested software.

“Through the hardware sector and the semiconductor industry, you have all these links to all the major players,” he says. “By leveraging those links and showing that Taiwan can ensure that the software running on the chips they built is doing the job it’s advertised to do, Taiwan can help integrate different pieces of software from different companies and gain a reputation for being a trusted integrator.”

But to establish such a competitive advantage, Taiwan’s government will need to implement mechanisms that encourage local IT companies to uncover security vulnerabilities and adopt quality verification tools.

“Nobody thinks Taiwan is going to become the only source of systems software, but it can be a hub that works with different players and shows emerging markets in particular how technologies can be better designed,” says Nelson. “And it’s not just in healthcare, the high-tech sector, banking, and e-government applications – it’s also in agriculture, food production, and retail.”

Nelson says that rather than providing a long list of detailed requirements, the government should form a cybersecurity framework that focuses on goals and milestones without stipulating how they should be achieved. “You want to focus on the results, not the mechanism.”

China threat misconception

Supply chain cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan is vital for the economic security of both, and collaboration has only strengthened with the increased attention to the importance of ICT products and semiconductor chips. The commitment of both sides to cooperate on related issues was reasserted in late 2021 when Taiwan and the U.S. established the Technology Trade and Investment Collaboration (TTIC), a new bilateral cooperation framework meant to develop commercial programs and strengthen critical technology supply chains.

TTIC is the latest addition to the two parties’ already established communication channels on economic issues, which also consist of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) and the U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue. It is seen as a way for the U.S. to strengthen its role in the semiconductor industry and reiterate the importance of the bilateral U.S.-Taiwan commercial and investment relationship.

Such collaborative activity might not be enough, however. Convincing more American companies to include Taiwan in their supply chains will require creating greater confidence in Taiwan’s production stability and its government’s capability in data management and protection, says Nelson. Companies will also need assurance that they will not be affected by geopolitical maneuvering.

“If companies worry that their supply chain is going to be disrupted for geopolitical reasons, then they’re less inclined to work with companies in those countries.”

Recognizing these concerns, Minister Deng emphasized Taiwan’s trustworthiness and reliability during his opening statement at the U.S.-Taiwan supply chain seminar. Deng declared to the audience that Taiwan is a safe and reliable partner, and that it “actively maintains supply chain security” and has “never coerced any other countries with economic means.”

But to assure businesses that Taiwan will remain a stable partner, the island will need to assuage fears of potential military conflict. Hammond-Chambers notes that although many experts agree that China is unlikely to launch a military attack on Taiwan in the near future, media and think tank preoccupation with possible future scenarios could trickle into boardrooms and influence business decisions.

“They see what’s happening in Ukraine, and it’s easy for people to jump to conclusions about Taiwan,” he says. “Future global supply chains are likely to evolve into a red [Chinese] supply chain and alternate supply chains that include Southeast Asia on a grander scale. Whether companies’ attempts to ‘China-proof’ their businesses will result in an exclusion of Taiwan remains to be seen.”

(Source: https://topics.amcham.com.tw/2022/04/opportunity-and-risk-for-taiwans-supply-chains/

2022-02-16

Intel Kills Two Birds with One Stone as Tower Acquisition Strengthens Mature Process Platforms and Regional Production Capabilities, Says TrendForce

Intel officially confirmed on February 15 that it will acquire Israeli foundry Tower Semiconductor for nearly US$6 billion, and the deal will likely contribute to the growth of Intel’s foundry business if it reaches a successful conclusion, according to TrendForce’s latest investigations. Tower was 9th place in the global ranking of foundries by revenue for 4Q21 and operates a total of seven production sites across Israel, the US, and Japan. Tower’s foundry capacity in 12-inch wafer equivalents accounts for about 3% of the global total. The majority share of Tower’s foundry capacity is for 8-inch wafers, and Tower’s share of the global 8-inch wafer foundry capacity is around 6.2%. Regarding manufacturing process platforms, Tower offers nodes ranging from 0.8µm to 65nm. It has a diverse range of specialty process technologies for manufacturing products in relatively small quantities. Products that Tower has been contracted to manufacture are mostly RF-SOI components, PMICs, CMOS sensors, discretes, etc. As such, the Tower acquisition is expected to help Intel expand its presence in the smartphone, industrial equipment, and automotive electronics markets.

Although Intel undertook a series of business strategies to compete with TSMC and Samsung, IFS (Intel Foundry Services) has historically manufactured with platform technologies for processors such as CPUs and GPUs. Furthermore, competition still persists between Intel and certain foundry clients that require advanced processes below the 10nm node, such as AMD and Nvidia, which have long histories of developing server products, PC CPUs, GPUs, or other HPC-related chips. Intel’s preexisting competitive relationship with these companies may become a barrier to IFS’ future expansion because IFS will be relatively unlikely to attract them as customers.

Taking the aforementioned factors into account, TrendForce believes that the Tower acquisition will likely expand IFS’ business presence in the foundry industry through two considerations. First of all, the acquisition will help Intel both diversify its mature process technologies and expand its clientele. Thanks to advancements in communication technologies and an increase in demand for new energy vehicles, there has been a recent surge in demand for RF-SOI components and PMICs. Tower’s long-term focus on the diverse mature process technologies used to manufacture these products means it also possesses a long-term collaborative relationship with clients in such markets. By acquiring Tower, Intel is therefore able to address IFS’ limited foundry capabilities and limited clientele. The second consideration pertains to the indigenization of semiconductor manufacturing and supply allocations, which have become increasingly important issues in light of current geopolitical situations. As Tower operates fabs in Asia, EMEA, and North America, the acquisition is in line with Intel’s current strategic aim to reduce the disproportionate concentration of the foundry industry’s supply chain in Asia. As well, Intel holds long-term investments and operates fabs in both the US and Israel, so the Tower acquisition will give Intel more flexibility in allocating production capacities, thereby further mitigating risks of potential supply chain disruptions arising from geopolitical conflicts.

In addition to the aforementioned synergy derived from acquiring Tower, it should also be pointed out that Intel is set to welcome an upcoming partnership with Nuvoton. Tower’s three Japan-based fabs were previously operated under TowerJazz Panasonic Semiconductor, a joint venture created by Tower and Panasonic in 2014, with Tower and Panasonic each possessing 51% and 49% ownership, respectively. After Nuvoton acquired PSCS (Panasonic Semiconductor Solutions Co.) in 2020, Panasonic’s 49% ownership of the three fabs was subsequently transferred to Nuvoton. Following Intel’s Tower acquisition, Intel will now possess the 51% majority ownership of the fabs and jointly operate their production lines for industrial MCUs, automotive MCUs, and PMICs along with Nuvoton. Notably, these production lines also span the range of CIS, MCU, and MOSFET technologies previously developed by Panasonic.

For more information on reports and market data from TrendForce’s Department of Semiconductor Research, please click here, or email Ms. Latte Chung from the Sales Department at lattechung@trendforce.com

2022-02-15

[Russia-Ukraine] The Conflict Affects Semiconductor Gas Supply and May Cause Rise in Chip Production Costs, Says TrendForce

Ukraine is a major supplier of raw material gases for semiconductors including neon, argon, krypton, and xenon, according to TrendForce’s investigations. Ukraine supplies nearly 70% of the world’s neon gas capacity. Although the proportion of neon gas used in semiconductor processes is not as high as in other industries, it is still a necessary resource. If the supply of materials is cut off, there will be an impact on the industry. TrendForce believes that, although the Ukrainian-Russian conflict may affect the supply of inert gas regionally, semiconductor factories and gas suppliers are stocked and there are still supplies from other regions. Thus, gas production line interruptions in Ukraine will not halt semiconductor production lines in the short term. However, the reduction in gas supply will likely lead to higher prices which may increase the cost of wafer production.

Inert gases are primarily used in semiconductor lithography processes. When the circuit feature size is reduced to below 220nm, it begins to enter the territory of DUV (deep ultraviolet) light source excimer lasers. The wavelength of the DUV light generated by the energy beam advances circuit feature sizes to below 180nm. The inert gas mixture required in the DUV excimer laser contains neon gas. Neon gas is indispensable in this mixture and, thus, difficult to replace. The semiconductor lithography process that requires neon gas is primarily DUV exposure, and encompasses 8-inch wafer 180nm to 12-inch wafer 1Xnm nodes.

TrendForce research shows, in terms of foundries, global production capacity at the 180~1Xnm nodes accounts for approximately 75% of total capacity. Except for TSMC and Samsung, who provide advanced EUV processes, for most fabs, the proportion of revenue attributed to the 180~1Xnm nodes exceeds 90%. In addition, the manufacturing processes of components in extreme short supply since 2020, including PMIC, Wi-Fi, RFIC, and MCU all fall within the 180~1Xnm node range. In terms of DRAM, in addition to Micron, Korean manufacturers are gradually increasing the proportion of 1alpha nm nodes (using the EUV process) but more than 90% of production capacity still employs the DUV process.  In addition, all NAND Flash capacity utilizes DUV lithography technology.

For more information on reports and market data from TrendForce’s Department of Semiconductor Research, please click here, or email Ms. Latte Chung from the Sales Department at lattechung@trendforce.com

2021-12-02

Foundry Revenue Rises by 12% QoQ for 3Q21 Thanks to Peak Season, New Production Capacity, and Rising Prices, Says TrendForce

Although the demand for end products related to the stay-at-home economy slowed down as many countries saw rising vaccination rates and were partially lifting social distancing restrictions, the decline in foundry orders from this source was more than offset by the traditional peak season for smartphones, according to TrendForce’s latest investigations. At the same time, OEMs for notebook (laptop) computers, networking devices, automotive electronics, and IoT devices kept vigorously building up their inventories because the earlier capacity crunch in the foundry market was constraining them from reaching their shipment targets. Because of these developments, demand continued to outstrip supply in the foundry market during 3Q21. As for foundries, they have been gradually taking on new production capacity in the recent period and gaining from the ongoing rise in the ASP. Thanks to robust demand, new production capacity, and rising wafer prices, the quarterly total foundry revenue rose by 11.8% QoQ to reach a new record high of US$27.28 billion for 3Q21. This result indicated nine consecutive quarters of revenue growth.

Top four foundries posted double-digit revenue growth for 3Q21 due to peak season for smartphones; SMIC’s revenue growth was slightly limited by restrictions imposed on its capacity expansions

TSMC raised its quarterly revenue by 11.9% QoQ to US$14.88 billion as it benefited from the release of new iPhone models. The foundry remained firmly at the top of the ranking in 3Q21. Regarding TSMC’s revenue generation by node, the combined revenue share of the 7nm and 5nm nodes has already surpassed 50% and is still expanding thanks to continued demand for smartphone chips and HPC chips. Samsung raised its revenue by 11% QoQ to US$4.81 billion for 3Q21 and sat firmly in second place. The revenue growth was attributed to several factors. First, the releases of new smartphone models during the second half of the year has spurred the demand for SoCs and DDIs. Second, fab Line S2 in Austin has returned to its normal level of revenue contribution following the recovery from the winter storm that struck Texas in the earlier part of this year. Third, fab Line S5 in Pyeongtaek has activated its newly added production capacity. And finally, the revenue result for 2Q21 was a low base for comparison and thus led to a rather impressive performance for 3Q21.

UMC made significant gains in 3Q21 because the activation of new production capacity for its 28/22nm nodes led to an increase in wafer input for OLED driver ICs and other components. This also caused a rise in its blended ASP. UMC’s revenue went up by 12.2% QoQ to US$2.04 billion for 3Q21. With a growth rate that surpassed the top two ranking leaders, UMC retained third place by overtaking GlobalFoundries in the ranking for the first time in 1Q20, and its lead has been gradually widening since then. GlobalFoundries posted a QoQ increase of 12% in revenue to US$1.71 billion for 3Q21 and kept fourth place in the ranking. To address the worldwide chip shortage, GlobalFoundries has announced a series of capacity expansions and greenfield projects this year. Existing plants including Fab1 in Dresden and Fab8 in Malta (which is a town in the state of New York) will take on new production capacity. New plants will also be built in Singapore and Malta. It is worth noting that the capacity expansions and greenfield projects that GlobalFoundries has revealed so far for this year will be financed via a public-private partnership model. GlobalFoundries will be leveraging funding from governments and advance payments from its clients to reduce the pressure of rising capital expenditure and ensure that the new production capacity will operate at a high utilization rate in the future.

SMIC increased its revenue by 5.3% QoQ to US$1.42 billion for 3Q21 and was ranked fifth. Two reasons were behind the revenue growth. First, there is a stable level of demand for its PMICs, Wi-Fi chips, MCUs, and RFICs. Second, SMIC has been steadily raising wafer prices. It is also worth pointing out that SMIC has been adjusting its product mix and client base due to geopolitical factors. Growing consistently over the quarters, the share of Chinese clients in SMIC’s client base came to almost 70% in 3Q21. Under the impetus of the semiconductor policies of the Chinese government, SMIC will continue to give priority to the demand from domestic clients. Hence, the portion of foreign clients in its incoming orders will gradually shrink relative to that of domestic clients.

Second- and third-tier foundries posted higher revenue growth rates compared with first-tier counterparts because of strong demand for mature nodes

HuaHong Group posted a QoQ increase of 21.4% in revenue to US$799 million for 3Q21, thereby taking sixth place in the ranking. HuaHong continues to raise its ASP as it production capacity is expected to be fully loaded through the whole 2021. This development, together with the successful capacity expansion undertaken at its Fab7 in Wuxi, contributed to the above-expected revenue result for the foundry. PSMC’s revenue growth continued to pick up pace in 3Q21 thanks to the general rise in wafer prices and the robust demand for the main categories of chip products (e.g., DDIs, PMICs, CIS, and power discretes such as MOSFETs and IGBTs). PSMC raised its quarterly revenue by 14.4% QoQ to US$525 million and was ranked seventh.

After surpassing Tower Semiconductor in the ranking for the first time in 2Q21, VIS maintained its strong growth momentum by posting a QoQ increase of 17.5% in revenue to US$426 million in 3Q21 on account of several factors. First, VIS increased its products shipments through capacity expansion. Furthermore, VIS was able to optimize its product mix and raise its ASP. It secured eighth place in the ranking. Occupying ninth place in the ranking, Tower Semiconductor’s performance exceeded expectations for 3Q21 with its revenue climbing 6.9% QoQ to US$387 million. Tower’s revenue generation mainly benefited from the stable demand related to RF-SOI chips, industrial sensor chips, and PMICs.

Taking the tenth place in the ranking, DB HiTek registered a 15.6% QoQ increase in revenue to a record high of US$283 million for 3Q21 because of the rising ASP. In the past year, DB HiTek kept its capacity utilization rate at almost 100%. To raise its overall output, the foundry has decided to focus its expansion efforts on its existing wafer production lines. As a result, its production capacity has been increasing slightly since 2Q21. The additional production capacity will effectively contribute to its revenue generation in 4Q21.

Moving into 4Q21, although foundries have undertaken various capacity expansions and greenfield projects, their new production capacity that has been activated this year is already completely booked. The new fabs that foundries have announced will need some time to get built and fully set up, so the chip shortage on the whole will unlikely ease off anytime soon. On the demand side, sales have weakened a bit for TVs and other end products associated with the stay-at-home economy. However, the hardware and infrastructure demand related to 5G, Wi-Fi 6, and IoT continues to gain momentum. Moreover, OEMs for consumer electronics are still stocking up on components in preparation for the year-end holiday sales. Based on the latest examination of incoming foundry orders, TrendForce finds that foundries will continue to operate at fully-loaded capacity. Due to the undersupply situation, the overall ASP of the foundry market has also been climbing. Meanwhile, foundries have been optimizing their product mixes to boost their financial performances. Taking account of this and other aforementioned developments, TrendForce believes that revenue growth will continue for the top 10 foundries in 4Q21. However, 4Q21 will also see more moderate growth compared with the previous quarter because there is a shortage of peripheral ICs made using mature process nodes. Additionally, demand has slacked a bit for some SoC products.

For more information on reports and market data from TrendForce’s Department of Semiconductor Research, please click here, or email Ms. Latte Chung from the Sales Department at lattechung@trendforce.com

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